

Message Text

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TO USDEL SECRETARY FLASH

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AMEMBASSY BONN FLASH

S E C R E T STATE 080664 TOSEC 030054

NODIS

WTE-1 FOR USDEL SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:MNUC, NATO, NPG

SUBJECT: ENHANCED RADIATION: TALKING POINTS FOR DEPUTY
SECRETARY

BONN FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY VEST.
AMBASSADOR AND PM DEPUTY DIRECTOR GOMPERT ONLY

1. FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY: FOLLOWING ARE DRAFT TALKING
POINTS FOR YOUR PRESENTATION TO SCHMIDT ON ERW. THEY HAVE
NOT YET BEEN CLEARED WITH THE SECRETARY OR THE PRESIDENT.

2. FOR THE SECRETARY AND DR. BRZEZINSKI: REQUEST YOU PASS
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COMMENTS, CLEARANCE TO DEPUTY SECRETARY IN BONN DIRECTLY.

3. FOR THE SECRETARY AND DR. BRZEZINSKI AND THE DEPUTY
SECRETARY: THE FOLLOWING PRESENTATION IS ORGANIZED IN FOUR
SECTIONS. THE FIRST SECTION STATES THE OBJECTIVES WHICH WE
HAVE SOUGHT TO OBTAIN IN THE CONSIDERATION OF ERW. SECTION
TWO OUTLINES THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION AND THE REASONS THERE-
FOR. THE THIRD SECTION DISCUSSES THE CONTENT OF THE
PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT THE US WOULD PLAN TO MAKE ON THE

PRESIDENT'S ERW DECISION AND PRESENTS FURTHER EXPLANATIONS OF THAT ANNOUNCEMENT FOR USE WITH SCHMIDT PRIVATELY. THE FOURTH SECTION ADDRESSES QUESTIONS WHICH MAY ARISE AS A RESULT OF A DECISION, AND PRESENTS OUR STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH THEM.

4. BEGIN TEXT:

I. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES:

DURING THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, WE HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN SERIOUS DISCUSSION WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND OUR OTHER ALLIES ON THE BEST APPROACH TO TAKE TOWARDS ERW. GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY HELPFUL, AND PRESIDENT HAS BEEN DEEPLY GRATIFIED BY THE PERSONAL ROLE PLAYED BY CHANCELLOR. DURING THESE DISCUSSIONS, THE WHOLE APPROACH ON THIS QUESTION WITHIN THE US GOVERNMENT AND WITHIN THE ALLIANCE HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO MEET FOUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES, WHICH WERE THE BASIS OF MY LETTER TO YOU IN NOVEMBER:

(L) TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE INCREASED SOVIET/WARSAW PACT MILITARY THREAT, WHICH HAS CENTERED IN ARMOR, BUT WHICH HAS ALSO HAD A MAJOR IMPACT, ESPECIALLY IN PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMS, WITH THE SS-20 AND BACKFIRE.

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(2) TO MODERNIZE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES IN A WAY THAT BEST MEETS ALLIANCE NEEDS AND UNDERLINES THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE VIEW THE INCREASING SOVIET MILITARY THREAT TO WESTERN EUROPE.

(3) TO MAINTAIN ALLIED UNITY IN THE FACE OF AN INCREASING SOVIET MILITARY THREAT TO WESTERN EUROPE AND TO PREVENT SOVIETS FROM DRIVING A WEDGE BETWEEN ANY OF THE ALLIES.

(4) TO DEAL WITH THE SPECIFIC ERW ISSUE, AS IT HAS EMERGED AS A FOCUS OF PUBLIC CONCERN, IN THE BEST POSSIBLE WAY: EITHER TO DEVELOP A SOLID RATIONALE FOR GOING FORWARD, OR TO DEVELOP AN ARMS CONTROL CONTEXT WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY NON-PRODUCTION AND NON-DEPLOYMENT.

II. DECISION AND RATIONALE:

THE PRESIDENT HAS CONTINUED TO REVIEW ALL OF THE FACTORS RELATED TO THE ISSUE IN THE LIGHT OF THESE OBJECTIVES. THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED ME TO SPEAK WITH YOU ABOUT THE CONCLUSIONS HE HAS REACHED.

-- FIRST, HE HAS COME TO THE VIEW THAT IT IS NOT IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE ALLIANCE FOR HIM TO FAVOR THE PRODUCTION OF ERW.

-- SECOND, BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS JUDGEMENT, HE WANTED TO GET YOUR VIEWS BEFORE TAKING THE FINAL STEP IN HIS DECISION, INFORMING THE OTHER ALLIES, AND ANNOUNCING THAT DECISION PUBLICLY.

THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED ME TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL DECISION ON ERW PRODUCTION HAS ALWAYS BEEN HIS RESPONSIBILITY, AND THAT HE IS TAKING FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DECISION.

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THE PRESIDENT HAS REACHED HIS JUDGEMENT NOT TO PRODUCE ERW FOR FOUR PRINCIPAL REASONS:

(1) HE BELIEVES STRONGLY THAT HIS DECISION MUST BE MADE ON THE MERITS OF THE ERW CASE. THE PRESIDENT IS CONVINCED THAT THE US AND NATO CAN MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE AT LEAST AS EFFECTIVELY THROUGH OTHER CONVENTIONAL AND THEATER NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS.

(2) THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE WEAPON, ALTHOUGH REPRESENTING AN ARGUMENT FOR GOING FORWARD WITH IT, IS NOT A GOOD ENOUGH REASON FOR GOING FORWARD. A MORE IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION LIES IN THE POLITICAL PROBLEM THAT ERW HAS CREATED IN MOST ALLIED COUNTRIES -- A PROBLEM WHICH EITHER THREATENS, OR COULD THREATEN, A DECLINE IN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR RELATED BUT MORE ESSENTIAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS.

(3) WE NEED TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS HIS CONCLUSION THAT THIS CAN BEST BE PURSUED NOT BY ATTEMPTING A SPECIFIC ARMS CONTROL LINK ON ERW, BUT RATHER BY TAKING A UNILATERAL STEP, COUPLED WITH A MORE GENERALIZED CALL FOR A SOVIET RESPONSE AND OTHER SPECIFIC STEPS IN TERMS OF NATO POSTURE TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET THREAT.

THE PRESIDENT HAS COME TO THIS VIEW IN FULL RECOGNITION AND APPRECIATION OF THE FIRMNESS AND DEDICATION OF ALLIED LEADERS, WHO HAVE BEEN STEADFAST IN THEIR WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT AN ALLIANCE POSITION.

III. PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT AND EXPLANATION

THE PRESIDENT PROPOSES TO ANNOUNCE HIS CONCLUSION PUBLICLY SOON. IN THAT ANNOUNCEMENT, HE WOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING

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POINTS:

(1) THE US WILL FOREGO PRODUCTION OF ERW.

(2) WE HAVE COME TO THIS DECISION OUT OF THE CONVICTION THAT WE CAN MEET NATO SECURITY CONCERNS EFFECTIVELY THROUGH OTHER MEANS.

(3) WE WILL CONTINUE TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE A RANGE OF MILITARY SYSTEMS IN NATO, INCLUDING CONVENTIONAL AND THEATER NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION, TO MEET THE SOVIET THREAT

IN EUROPE.

(ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOT BE PART OF THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT, YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN TO SCHMIDT THAT THIS POINT REFERS, ON THE THEATER NUCLEAR SIDE, TO OUR BELIEF THAT WE NEED TO MOVE FORWARD WITH A BALANCED MODERNIZATION PROGRAM. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE NEED TO GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP'S VIEW THAT LONGER RANGE SYSTEMS MAY REQUIRE SOME ADJUSTMENTS MORE THAN SHORTER RANGE, BATTLE-FIELD SYSTEMS. ON THE CONVENTIONAL SIDE, IN TERMS OF DIRECTLY MEETING THE ARMOR THREAT, WE ARE STRONGLY SUPPORTING THE NATO LONG TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM, A MAJOR PART OF WHICH IS FOCUSED ON IMPROVING CAPABILITIES TO COUNTER THE SOVIET THREAT. MORE CAN BE DONE IN COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT

OF MODERN PRECISION-GUIDED ANTI-ARMOR WEAPONS FOR THE NEXT GENERATION, AND IN THE OVERALL PROGRAM TO BOLSTER NATO'S CONVENTIONAL POSTURE. THIS WILL ENABLE US TO DEAL WITH THE SOV,PT ARMORED THREAT.)

(4) THE U.S.CALLS UPON THE SOVIET UNION TO SHOW A COMMITMENT TOIMPRO-
ING SECURITY ANDREDUCING TENSION BYTAKING CONCRETESTEPS IN ARMS
CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING EUROPE

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(YOU SHOULD TELL SCHMIDT THAT WE HAVE CONCLUDED IT IS NOT IN OUR INTEREST TO SEEK A SPECIFIC ARMS CONTROL LINKAGE. WE HAVE MADE A DECISION NOT TO PRODUCE ERW, AND WOULD NOT WANT TO REOPEN THAT BY TYING IT TO SOME SPECIFIC SOVIET ACTION. WHETHER OR NOT THE SOVIETS ARE NOW WILLING TO RESPOND POSITIVELY IN ARMS CONTROL AFFECTING EUROPEAN SECURITY, WE WILL BE IN A BETTER POSITION THROUGH THIS DECISION TO SHIFT PRESSURE FOR MOVEMENT ONTO THEM AND GIVE US THE INITIATIVE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS.)

(5) THE US HAS HAD EXTENSIVE AND CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH ITS NATO ALLIES THROUGHOUT, AND GREATLY APPRECIATES THE

SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING WHICH THEY HAVE SHOWN. THE ERW PRODUCTION DECISION HAS ALWAYS BEEN ONE FOR THE US TO MAKE. (YOU SHOULD TELL SCHMIDT THAT THE PRESIDENT WANTS YOU TO ASSURE HIM THAT THE PRESIDENT IS EXTREMELY GRATEFUL FOR ALLIED SUPPORT, PARTICULARLY SCHMIDT'S PERSONAL ROLE, DURING THE CONSIDERATION OF ERW. NOTHING THE PRESIDENT OR THE USG WILL SAY ON THIS ISSUE WILL LEAVE ANY OPPORTUNITY FOR ANYONE TO SUGGEST OTHERWISE ABOUT THE FRG OR ANY OTHER ALLY.)

IV. FURTHER ISSUES:

THE CONCLUSIONS TO WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAS COME RAISE SOME FURTHER ISSUES, AND THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED THAT I EXPLAIN HOW WE PROPOSE TO DEAL WITH THEM. THESE INCLUDE:

--THE NEED TO AVOID THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE HAD AN INFLUENCE ON THE DECISION: WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS WILL BE A POLITICAL PROBLEM. TO THE CONTRARY, WE WILL

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STRESS THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN INFLUENCED BY THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN (INDEED THE SOVIET EFFORT BECAME ONE OF THE PRIME FACTORS ARGUING FOR GOING AHEAD WITH ERW). THE DECISION WAS MADE ON THE MERITS, IN TERMS OF COSTS AND BENEFITS TO NATO. ONCE ITS FULL IMPORT SETS IN WITH THE PUBLIC, WE BELIEVE

THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BE UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN EUROPE. WE WOULD IN VARIOUS FORUMS BE CALLING UPON THE SOVIETS TO DO SO.

-- THE NEED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT NATO CAN MEET THE MILITARY REQUIREMENT WITHOUT ERW. WE HAVE NEVER REGARDED ERW AS A PANACEA, NOR HAVE WE PRESENTED IT AS AN ESSENTIAL SOLUTION TO THE THREAT POSED BY SOVIET ARMOR. THE PUBLIC DEBATE ON THIS POINT HAS BEEN GREATLY OVERBLOWN BEGINNING WITH PUBLIC DISTORTION OF THE FACTS ABOUT ERW. WE HAVE JUDGED THAT ERW WOULD BE USEFUL MODERNIZATION OF OUR BATTLEFIELD THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES, BUT THAT IT WAS NOT ESSENTIAL TO NATO'S ABILITY TO DETER AND DEFEAT SOVIET ARMORED FORCES. AS NOTED EARLIER, WE WANT TO MOVE FORWARD WITH THE MODERNIZATION OF NATO'S CONVENTIONAL AND THEATER NUCLEAR POSTURE, AS DISCUSSED IN THE LTDP AND THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS REPRESENTS THE BEST USE OF ALLIANCE RESOURCES, AND THAT IT OFFERS A CONVINCING RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET ARMORED THREAT AND THE NEED TO PROVIDE FOR CONTINUED DETERRENCE. IF THE ALLIANCE MAKES A MAJOR UNIFIED EFFORT IN THE LTDP, WE WILL HAVE A MORE EFFECTIVE NATO POSTURE. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT MODERNIZATION OF OTHER PARTS OF THE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES CAN DEAL WITH THE SOVIET FORCE BUILD-UP MORE EFFECTIVELY. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE NEED TO GIVE CAREFUL CONSI-

DERATION TO THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP'S FINDING THAT NATO'S THEATER NUCLEAR
POSTURE BE MODERNIZED ACROSS THE SPECTRUM, OF SHORT TO LONG RANGE
SYSTEMS, WITH GREATER EMPHASIS TO BE PLACED ON LONGER RANGE SYSTEMS.

-- DEALING WITH PRESS AND PUBLICS IN A WAY WHICH WILL BE
SUPPORTIVE OF ALLIANCE UNITY. WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROCESS

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OF CONSULTATION IN THE ALLIANCE ON ERW HAS BEEN EXTREMELY
USEFUL IN DEALING WITH AN ISSUE OF GREAT COMPLEXITY AND
SENSITIVITY. WE WILL STRESS THE POSITIVE VALUE OF THE
CONSULTATION NOTING THAT THE PRODUCTION DECISION WAS, HOWEVER, THE
PRESIDENT'S RESPONSIBILITY. THE DECISION WAS NOT BASED
ON ANY FEAR OF CRITICISM IN THE ALLIANCE COUNTRIES, BUT
RATHER ON OUR OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTRIBUTION WHICH
THESE WEAPONS MIGHT MAKE TO NATO AND THE PROBLEMS WHICH THE
ISSUE MIGHT INVOLVE.

CONCLUSION:

THE PRESIDENT WILL VALUE YOUR REACTIONS TO THE APPROACH
I HAVE OUTLINED, PARTICULARLY CONCERNING THE NEED TO REDUCE
ANY ALLIED CONCERN OVER THE DECISION OR THE CONSULTATIONAL
PROCESS, AND TO AVOID A SITUATION WHICH THE SOVIETS MIGHT

ATTEMPT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF. END TEXT.

5. CONSULTATIONS: (FOR PRESIDENTIAL PARTY)

OUR THINKING ABOUT INFORMING OTHER ALLIES IS THAT ONCE
SCHMIDT GIVES US THE GREEN LIGHT WE WOULD SEND FLASH
CABLES TO ALL NATO CAPITALS AND USNATO INSTRUCTING
AMBASSADORS TO INFORM HIGHEST APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS
OF THIS DECISION ALONG PRECEDING LINES. USNATO WOULD DO
THIS IN NAC MEETING CONVENED FOR THIS PURPOSE. WE
WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU ON TIMING. DRAFT OF ANNOUNCE-
MENT FOLLOWS IN SEPARATE MESSAGE. COOPER

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